Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Diversity of Citizenship - Third Party Practice by K., R.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 1 | Number 4
May 1939
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Diversity of
Citizenship - Third Party Practice
R. K.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
R. K., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Diversity of Citizenship - Third Party Practice, 1 La. L. Rev. (1939)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol1/iss4/17
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
dom of activity by the present practice 21 of the motion picture
industry. These will continue unless halted by state or federal
legislation. The present federal anti-trust laws have been in-
effectual to date due to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient proof
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.2 2 State legislation as to the
distribution of films must run the gauntlet of invalidity on the
ground of unduly burdening interstate commerce, for distribution
clearly involves interstate commerce.23 Although the North Da-
kota statute herein involves an intrastate activity, it does bear
some relation to interstate commerce. Whether it unduly burdens
interstate commerce will be decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the near future.2' The Supreme Court may
possibly find-and properly so-that exhibition, although among
the activities which are themselves intrastate commerce, has a
direct and important relation to interstate commerce and is sus-
ceptible of both state and federal regulation.
F.S.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-DIVERSITY OF CITIZEN-
SHIP-THIRD PARTY PRACTICE-The plaintiff, a resident of Penn-
sylvania, brought an action in a Pennsylvania court against
McGwinn, a nonresident, to recover for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile collision. On the petition of this defendant,
the case was removed into the federal court which thereupon
21. Unless affiliated with one of these companies or an independent
circuit, the independent exhibitor is (1) faced with inferior bargaining
power, (2) harassed by "block" booking contracts which force him to take
poor pictures along with good ones, (3) subjected to clearance schedules
which prevent him from obtaining the best pictures for a specified time
after the first run, and (4) discriminated against in obtaining contracts.
See Comment (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 424; Note (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 635.
22. The courts have laid great emphasis on the determination of whether
or not the distributors have acted in concert or as a result of an under-
standing among themselves in the adoption of a particular type of con-
tract provisions. Very little consideration has as yet been given to what
provisions in the contract are reasonable and why they indirectly affect
but do not burden interstate commerce. Cf. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 51 S.Ct. 42, 75 L.Ed. 145 (1930); United States
v. First National Pictures, 282 U.S. 44, 51 S.Ct. 45, 75 L.Ed. 151 (1930); Fed-
eral Trade Comm. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1932).
23. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 44 S.Ct. 96, 68 L.Ed.
808 (1923); Majestic Theatre Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F. (2d) 991
(D.C. Conn. 1930).
24. There is now pending in the federal courts an action filed by the
United States Department of Justice against the eight major producers
and distributors for violation of the Sherman Act, seeking to compel them
to relinquish their ownership or interests in theaters. United States v.
Paramount Pictures (Equity 87-273, S.D. N.Y. 1938).
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granted his motion under Rule 14a' of the New Rules of Civil
Procedure to make Siegel a third party defendant. This third
party was a resident of Pennsylvania and had been the driver
of the car in which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the
collision. On motion to quash on the ground that the plaintiff
and Siegel were citizens of the same state, the court held that
it had jurisdiction since the third party claim was merely ancil-
lary to the original action.2 Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412
(W.D. Pa. 1939).
Rule 14a is broad in its scope and if applied liberally is far
reaching in its application.8 The purpose of its adoption seems to
have been to facilitate the trial of cases and to provide a means
whereby two or more suits might be tried and settled at one
and the same time.4 Several states have impleader statutes, the
most notable of which are those of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and
New York.5 Somewhat similar but much narrower in scope is
Louisiana's method of vouching in warranty.6 The New Rule 14a
1. Rule 14a, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "When Defendant May
Bring in Third Party. Before the service of his answer a defendant may
move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plain-
tiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the
motion is granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person
so served, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims
against the plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff, or any other party as pro-
vided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defen-
dant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to
the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party
plaintiff. The plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against the third-
party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against
the third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant.
A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him or to the third-
party plaintiff for all or part of the claim made in the action against
the third-party defendant."
2. A similar conclusion was recently reached by the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia: Crum v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. W.Va. 1939).
The question here presented is entirely new, never having been passed
upon by the Supreme Court.
3. Illsen, The Preliminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1937) 11 St. John's L. Rev. 212, 228: "Whether an impleader will be granted
in negligence actions where there are joint tort feasors is a matter of
speculation. The Proposed Rule is certainly broad enough to permit it."
4. Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D.C.
D.C. 1939). See Bennett, Bringing in Third Parties by the Defendant (1935)
19 Minn. L. Rev. 163.
5. 1 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 735.
6. Arts. 378-388, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Cf. Flory and McMahon,




is patterned upon Admiralty Rule 56,7 which seems to be less
limited than any of the foregoing.
There was no right of contribution between joint tortfeasors
at common law.8 An injured party could sue either or both, and
neither had any right against the other,9 the underlying theory
being to deny a party the right to invoke the law to seek indem-
nity for his own violation. Since the third party defendant is
a joint tortfeasor he, as well as the third party plaintiff, may
be found liable1 ° and may have to satisfy the whole judgment."
Had the plaintiff originally instituted suit against the defen-
dant McGwinn and third party defendant Siegel in the same suit
as joint tortfeasors, the federal court would have been deprived
of jurisdiction;12 but through the effectual application of Rule
14a, the third party defendant was called in and the third party
claim was treated as merely ancillary and incidental to the prin-
cipal action. The holding that the third party defendant was
not an indispensable party seems to be well within the general
rule that when the jurisdiction of the federal court has once
'attached it is not subject to divestiture by subsequent events. 3
The present case is somewhat analogous to Phelps v. Oaks,14
where a citizen of Pennslyvania brought suit in a Missouri court
to recover property from a citizen of Missouri. The case was re-
moved to the federal court and the defendant, a tenant, moved
to bring in the real owners of the property who were residents
of Pennsylvania, as allowed by state statute. A motion to dismiss
7. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1936) 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 536.
8. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
9. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 25
S.Ct. 226, 49 L.Ed. 453, 2 Ann. Cas. 525 (1905); Thalheim v. Suhren, 137 So.
874 (La. App. 1931); Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J. Law 523, 154 Atl. 326, 75
A.L.R. 1464 (1931); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E.
194, 75 A.L.R. 1481 (1930); City of Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac.
642, Ann. Cas. 1913B 934, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 582 (1911).
10. The PBeaconsfleld, 158 U.S. 303, 15 S.Ct. 860, 39 L.Ed. 993 (1895);
Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764 (1920); Nashville, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Jones, 100 Tenn. 512, 45 S.W. 681 (1898). See also Harper, Torts
(1933) 676, § 302.
11. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). See
Note (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 235, 238. Cf. Note (1939) 1 LOUISIANA
LAw RaviEw 634.
12. Carpenter v. Carden, 294 Fed. 515 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1923).
13. Clarke v. Matthewson, 37 U.S. 164, 9 L.Ed. 1041 (1838); Phelps v.
Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 6 S.Ct. 714, 29 L.Ed. 888 (1886); Cohen v. Maryland
Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 4 F. (2d) 564 (1925); Simklns, Federal Practice
(8 ed. 1938) 337, § 384.
14. 117 U.S. 236, 6 S.Ct. 714, 29 L.Ed. 888 (1886).
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the case because the plaintiff and one of the defendants were
both citizens of Pennsylvania was denied.15
If the instant decision is permitted to stand, it may prove a
means of evading the effect of section 24 of the Judicial Code of
the United States16 whenever the plaintiff and one of the defen-
dants are citizens of the same state.1 The result would be an
increase of litigation in the federal courts in cases in which only
one of two or more joint tortfeasors have been sued. On the other
hand, if Rule 14a is given a narrow construction it will fre-
quently be absolutely useless.'8
R.K.
INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF "VACANT OR UNOCCUPIED"
CLAUSE IN FIRE POLICY-PROOF REQUIRED TO INvoKE LOUISIANA
ACT 222 OF 1928-The plaintiff sued the defendant insurance com-
pany to recover for the destruction by fire of his dwelling house
and its contents. The policy sued upon contained the provision
that, if the premises were vacant for a period exceeding 30 days,
or unoccupied for a period exceeding 60 days at any one time, the
policy would be void unless a special form of permission therefor
was attached. Payment was resisted on the ground that the plain-
tiff had not lived upon the insured property for a period of 112
days preceding and up to the time of the fire. Expert testimony
to the effect that an unoccupied property increased the physical
hazard was introduced.' Held, that the insured's failure to
15. The same rule was later followed in Cohens v. Maryland Casualty
Co. of Baltimore, 4 F. (2d) 564 (1925), where the plaintiff, a resident of the
Eastern District of South Carolina, brought an action of assault against
the Maryland Casualty Company, a Maryland corporation that was surety
on a sheriff's bond. This bond provided for indemnity of the Casualty
Company by the sheriff if it was subjected to liability. The sheriff, a citizen
of the Western District of South Carolina, was permitted to join the Cas-
ualty Company in defending the suit. The court held that since the juris-
diction of the court had once attached it could not be defeated by an
extraneous agreement for Indemnity between the Casualty Company and
the sheriff.
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1926).
17. Under § 24 of the U.S. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1926), It is
provided: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:
First ... Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity ... where
the matter in controversy . . Is between citizens of different States .. "
18. Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138, 139 (1939).
1. Proof of the increased moral or physical hazard Is necessary under
La. Act 222 of 1928 (Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4191], providing that a policy
of fire insurance cannot be avoided for "breach of any representation, war-
ranty or condition contained in the said policy, or In the application there-
for" unless such breach exists at the time of the loss and increases either
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